NSA's Domestic Surveillance: AT&T's Role and Patriot Act Implications

The provided texts primarily concern government surveillance programs and their legal challenges, particularly focusing on the National Security Agency's (NSA) collection of telephony metadata. The first source details a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, United States v. Moalin, where defendants convicted of supporting a terrorist organization appealed, claiming violations of their Fourth Amendment rights and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) due to the bulk collection of their phone records. While the court found the metadata collection may have been unconstitutional and did violate FISA's relevance requirements, it ultimately affirmed the convictions, ruling that suppression of evidence was not warranted in that specific instance. The other two sources, from the Electronic Frontier Foundation and ACLU, offer critical perspectives on these surveillance practices, highlighting how Section 215 of the Patriot Act and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 were interpreted to allow widespread data collection, potentially compromising privacy and First Amendment rights, and discuss the lack of effective oversight and legislative efforts for reform.

• Case Studies in Psychological Operations
  • The Crucible of Conflict: Major PSYOP Case Studies
  • Overarching Insights from the Case Studies
• Timeline of Main Events
  • Pre-1776:
  • 1776:
  • Early 20th Century (Pre-WWII):
  • World War II (1939-1945):
  • Post-WWII (Cold War Era):
  • Vietnam War Era (1960s-1970s):
  • Post-Vietnam (1970s-1980s):
  • Mid-1990s:
  • Late 1990s (Bosnia, Kosovo):
  • Early 2000s (Afghanistan, Counterterrorism):
  • Mid-2000s (Somalia, Metadata Collection):
  • 2010s:
• Cast of Characters
  • Military Leaders & Officials:
  • Civilian Government Officials & Experts:
  • Foreign Actors & Entities:

Case Studies in Psychological Operations

The sources provided offer a stark, unfiltered view of numerous PSYOP applications, detailing their objectives, methodologies, challenges, and perceived effectiveness across a spectrum of conflicts and political landscapes. From the calculated broadcasts in the Persian Gulf to the subtle manipulations of Soviet active measures, each instance serves as a critical lesson in the relentless war for the mind.

The Crucible of Conflict: Major PSYOP Case Studies

1. The Persian Gulf War (Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm) The Persian Gulf War stands as a chilling testament to the impact of coordinated PSYOP. Planning for these operations began almost immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

• Iraqi Propaganda Network: Saddam Hussein's regime employed a propaganda system meticulously modeled after the Soviet apparatus, leveraging religious symbolism, Arab nationalism, and praise of Saddam himself. Its objectives were to rationalize the invasion of Kuwait, garner support from Arab masses, discourage participation in the UN embargo, and hinder military attacks. This network operated with virtually no regard for truth, fabricating documentation and shifting narratives as needed, demonstrating a totalitarian approach where "missing or contrary facts" did not interfere with operations. Notable efforts included Saddam's appearances with hostages, portraying them as "guests," which spectacularly backfired when a British child's genuine reaction was broadcast, exposing the manipulation and eroding Saddam's credibility. "Baghdad Betty" broadcasts, intended to demoralize Coalition troops by suggesting their wives were unfaithful with celebrities like Tom Cruise and Bart Simpson, were widely perceived as farcfetched and ultimately ineffectual.
• Coalition PSYOP Efforts: In stark contrast, Coalition PSYOP focused on convincing Iraqi soldiers to surrender, integrating tactical efforts with air and ground campaigns. Key methods included radio transmissions, loudspeaker broadcasts, and leaflet disseminations, with significant input from Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) team actions. Over 29 million leaflets with 33 different messages were disseminated, delivered by a range of aircraft including MC-130s, F-16s, and B-52s, and even artillery. Themes evolved from peace and brotherhood to emphasizing UN deadlines and eventually to calls for abandonment of equipment and desertion. Radio platforms like "Voice of the Gulf" and "Voice of America" broadcast messages continuously. A critical technique was reinforcement: PSYOP personnel would announce impending bombings, and if the event occurred, follow up with confirmation, building credibility in the message and the delivery means. EPW interviews validated the success, with 70% of EPWs reporting messages had impacted their surrenders. However, early leaflet designs sometimes missed crucial nonverbal, cultural cues, leading to unintended "subtext" that startled even Arab partners, a lesson learned during post-hoc analysis. The overall success was attributed to the value of "truth as the best propaganda" and credible military performance overriding minor cultural missteps.

2. The Vietnam War (US and Vietcong Psychological Operations) Vietnam represented the "largest American effort in psychological operations since the second World War", yet it was also a complex arena of both success and failure for the US, contrasted sharply by the sophisticated approach of the Vietcong.

• US PSYOP: The US effort was initially decentralized among the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the US Information Service (USIS), and the Agency for International Development (AID), leading to difficulties in coordination. The Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was established in 1965 to integrate these activities, but challenges persisted. US PSYOP priorities included enhancing the image of the Government of Vietnam (GVN), the Chieu Hoi (come home) program, revolutionary development, refugee assistance, public safety, and countering hostile propaganda. Key psychological appeals leveraged by the US included fear of death, jungle hardships, loss of faith in victory, concern for family, and disillusionment. Techniques involved safe conduct passes, offers of money for weapons, and armed propaganda teams composed of former Vietcong (Hoi Chanh), who were particularly effective due to their personal touch. However, some efforts failed due to cultural insensitivity (e.g., using the "ace of spades" as a death symbol, which was not recognized in Vietnamese card decks, or gruesome leaflets that were seen as gloating). A critical lesson was the primacy of interpersonal communication over mass media, as Vietnamese often made decisions based on trusted friends and relatives, requiring PSYOP to work through intermediaries.
• Vietcong (VC) PSYOP: The Vietcong's approach was highly integrated and systematic, embodying the slogans "Political activities are more important than military activities" and "Fighting is less important than propaganda". Their overriding priority was the destruction of South Vietnam's armed forces, employing violence, armed attacks, assassinations, kidnappings, and terrorist acts. Douglas Pike identified three core VC PSYOP programs: Dan Van (developing support in VC-controlled areas), Dich Van (developing support in GVN-controlled areas), and Binh Van (recruiting among ARVN troops and GVN civilians). Binh Van aimed to induce unit desertions (preferably with sabotage) or individual defections (with destruction/theft of documents). The North Vietnamese also mastered the use of international media, particularly television, to advance their PSYOP objectives, while the US government struggled to mobilize public support.

3. Operation Just Cause and Promote Liberty (Panama) PSYOP played a prominent role in Panama, with visible deployments of loudspeakers and leaflets.

• Tactics and Objectives: Loudspeaker teams, deployed with major ground combat units, aimed to convince the enemy to cease resistance and surrender, while advising civilians to stay out of harm's way. This operation saw "probably the highest loudspeaker-to-combat force ratio in the history of the US military". A PSYOP Task Force (TF) provided national-level PSYOP support, using prepackaged radio, TV, and loudspeaker materials in Spanish. PSYOP quickly became the "first official US broadcasts in Spanish heard by the Panamanian population". The operation successfully used "Wanted" posters to round up former Panama Defense Force (PDF) and Dignity Battalion members, reassuring the populace. A "Twin Flag" mini-poster promoted US-Panamanian teamwork to counter perceptions of US forces as invaders.
• Challenges and Successes: Early integration of PSYOP into contingency planning was deemed crucial for overall success. The presence of PSYOP assessment teams (POATs) provided early staff support and recommended force combinations. Although the PSYOP TF main body arrived later, a small predeployed force planned and ran operations for the first three days. The operation highlighted the effectiveness of tactical loudspeaker teams and the population's compliance with US military PSYOP broadcasts. PSYOP also played a key role in flushing Noriega out of the Papal Nunciature and establishing the Panama Public Force. The immediate post-conflict phase, "Promote Liberty," saw even greater PSYOP activity, focusing on consolidating the new government, restoring information infrastructure, and gaining public support for the new police force. Lessons learned led to a provisional reorganization of the 4th PSYOP Group for greater flexibility.

4. The Libyan Raid (as a Psychological Operation) The 1986 US raid on Libya, though not initially planned as a PSYOP, was viewed by some as "strictly a psychological operation" to achieve a psychological point of view.

• Purpose and Impact: The raid's stated purposes were to emphasize the cost of state-sponsored terrorism, damage terrorist operations, and encourage internal insurrection. A pre-raid analysis revealed that many nations were not taking US concerns about state-sponsored terrorism seriously, Qadhafi was susceptible to depressive episodes, and there was internal dissatisfaction within the Libyan government, making the world "receptive to such a raid". The limited tactical air strike was considered the "best psychological operation approach" given prior attempts to influence Qadhafi. The raid was "extremely successful as a psychological operation," achieving its goals even if its tactical execution could have been less precise for the same psychological effect.

5. Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation Campaigns The Soviet Union's "active measures" represent a chilling masterclass in the deliberate and pervasive use of deception as a tool of statecraft.

• Techniques and Examples: These campaigns, with an estimated annual budget of $4 billion, involved a spectrum of white (overt), gray (semicovert), and black (covert) operations.
  • Forgeries: The KGB crafted and placed forgeries globally to undermine US relations with allies, influence public opinion against US policies, and convince audiences that US decisions were based on harmful secret plans. Examples include a false story of the US burying nuclear waste in Somalia, reprinted across Africa, and a double forgery targeting Cyprus. They also propagated the lie that the CIA was behind the assassination of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme and the 1978 Jonestown massacre.
  • Agents of Influence: Journalistic cover was a KGB priority, allowing agents to legitimately meet potential contacts and subtly persuade them through flattery to publish or broadcast information favoring Soviet lines, sometimes leading to blackmail.
  • Disinformation: A thoroughly documented campaign falsely attributed the cause of AIDS to CIA and Department of Defense (DOD) biological warfare experiments, leveraging fear and finding credibility in certain foreign audiences. Similar efforts framed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as "militarization of space" and an aggressive policy. Soviet propagandists also used "mirror-imaging," accusing the US and its allies of committing acts of barbarism that reflected actual Soviet atrocities, such as rolling victims in spiked barrels, to mitigate the impact of their own actions.
  • Indoctrination of Hate: Soviet military doctrine systematically cultivated hatred for the United States even in peacetime, training soldiers to be suspicious of foreigners and psychologically preparing them for war, viewing hate as a crucial quality for vigilance and combat readiness.
• Impact: These sophisticated efforts, particularly those under Gorbachev's "glasnost" (more accurately "publicity"), aimed to improve external opinion of the Soviet Union and secure Western technology, often merging professional propagandists with "innocent Western media".

6. The Hukbalahap Insurgency (Philippines) This campaign stands as a "model of the imaginative employment of psychological warfare".

• Strategic Integration: The Philippine government, under Ramon Magsaysay, with the aid of US advisors, integrated military, political, and psychological actions to successfully counter the insurgency. The core objective was to win the support of the population, which was achieved by fostering confidence in the government and demonstrating the futility of the insurgency. This involved concrete and useful actions, increasingly effective field combat operations, and supporting information/psywar initiatives. PSYWAR was considered "everybody's business".

7. Poland's Underground Media This case highlights successful nongovernmental PSYOP against an oppressive regime.

• Methods of Resistance: Drawing on a long tradition of a conspiratorial press, dissidents produced underground newsletters, leaflets, books, and used electronic media like VCRs, audiotapes, and microcomputers. Their purpose was to supply uncensored information on political, social, and economic issues and maintain a spirit of opposition.
• Government Countermeasures and Dissident Resilience: The regime attempted to discredit the underground media through black propaganda, forgeries, and covertly supplying erroneous information. However, dissident publishers often discovered and exposed these activities. Despite crackdowns, the use of modern technology by dissidents made it "virtually impossible for the regime to suppress their efforts," demonstrating the success of nongovernmental PSYOP.

8. Peacetime PSYOP (US Southern Command - USSOUTHCOM) PSYOP also operates in peacetime, often under different terminology to enhance palatability.

• Counterdrug and Humanitarian Missions: In USSOUTHCOM, "Regional Information Support Team (RIST)" or "Military Information Support Team (MIST)" are used instead of "PSYOP" for programs in Latin America. These teams support initiatives like the Andean Ridge Initiative to combat drug trafficking, funded largely by counterdrug money, and humanitarian demining missions. Activities include producing human rights posters, and eradication handbills/booklets that discourage illicit crops and explain the safety of herbicides like Glyphosate. This demonstrates PSYOP's role in shaping the operational environment and achieving national security objectives in non-combat scenarios.

9. Operation ALLIED FORCE (Kosovo) NATO's air campaign in 1999 saw PSYOP play a "key role".

• Information Dissemination: Over 104.5 million leaflets were dropped over Belgrade, Kosovo, and other areas. Thousands of posters, handbills, and newspapers were also produced. Daily radio and television programs, "NATO's Allied Voice Radio and Television," broadcast world news and information about the situation in Kosovo, counteracting heavily censored state-run media.
• Impact: PSYOP was considered a "combat and diplomatic multiplier" and a "weapon of first choice," effectively setting conditions for victory.

Overarching Insights from the Case Studies

The multitude of case studies reveals profound, recurring truths about Psychological Operations:

1. Credibility is the Cornerstone: Whether in war or peace, overt PSYOP's effectiveness hinges on the audience's perception of the communicator's credibility and capability to deliver on promises or threats. Falsehoods, like those in Iraqi propaganda or Soviet disinformation, quickly lose efficacy or backfire, though "economy of truth" is often employed.
2. Integration into the Operational Spectrum: PSYOP is not an isolated function but a "vital element" deeply integrated into diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities, applied across the entire range of military operations, from peacetime to high-intensity conflict. Its early integration into planning is consistently cited as critical for success.
3. Profound Target Audience Analysis: Success is predicated on a deep, continuous understanding of the target audience's identity, vulnerabilities, motives, emotions, cultural contexts, political views, and historical conditions. Missteps in cultural understanding can undermine even well-intentioned efforts, as seen in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf.
4. Diverse Media and Multifaceted Influence: PSYOP leverages every available medium—radio, TV, print (leaflets, posters, newspapers), loudspeakers, face-to-face communication, and digital platforms (VCRs, audiotapes, microcomputers)—to reach target audiences. The combination and orchestration of these channels are crucial for sustained impact and to bypass resistance.
5. Force Multiplier, Cost-Effective Weapon: PSYOP consistently functions as a "force multiplier," accelerating military outcomes, reducing casualties, and achieving objectives at a lower cost than purely kinetic means. This makes it a "weapon of first choice" in many scenarios.
6. The Persistent Challenge of Bureaucracy and Perception: Despite its demonstrated value, PSYOP has historically faced institutional biases, a lack of consistent political and military acceptance, and negative connotations (e.g., "propaganda" as a "black art"). This often leads to under-resourcing, insufficient training, and a struggle for strategic integration.

These case studies collectively illustrate that PSYOP, when meticulously planned, credibly executed, and thoroughly integrated, can profoundly alter the course of events. However, they also expose the constant struggle against inherent biases, cultural complexities, and the ever-present threat of a manipulated reality.

Timeline of Main Events

Pre-1776:

• Ancient Times (before 500 B.C.): Sun Tzu's "Art of War" advocates subduing the enemy without a fight, emphasizing the psychological dimension of warfare.
• 13th Century B.C.: Gideon employs a psychological warfare deception against the Midianites, creating the illusion of a larger force to induce retreat.

1776:

• American Revolutionary War: Leaflets are passed out to British soldiers at the Battle of Bunker Hill, promising free land if they defect, an early example of US psychological operations (PSYOP).

Early 20th Century (Pre-WWII):

• World War I: Psychological operations (then known as "propaganda") come into their own as a formal activity, with many countries forming military units specializing in propaganda, primarily distributing leaflets by balloon and aircraft.
• 1920s: Accounts of the Cheka (early KGB forerunner) torture methods, including rolling victims in barrels with spikes, later become a source for Soviet disinformation.
• 1940: Goebbels orchestrates Nazi psychological operations in the collapse of France, utilizing radio, press, demonstrations, agents, and screaming dive bombers to achieve political and military objectives.

World War II (1939-1945):

• World War II: Propaganda activities become known as "psychological warfare" (psywar). Public broadcast radio and tank-mounted loudspeakers are used.
• 1942 (November): The Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) at Allied Forces Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ) is activated in North Africa under General Dwight D. Eisenhower.
• 1943-1944: Mobile Radio Broadcasting (MRB) Companies, equipped with public address systems, radios, printing presses, and leaflet bombs, are improvised and deployed to support frontline conventional combat units.
• 1944 (February): The PWB/AFHQ is expanded to the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF).
• 1944 (November): General Dwight D. Eisenhower tells American newspaper editors that he considers accredited correspondents "quasi-staff officers."
• World War II (throughout): The Doolittle raid against Japan is considered an important PSYOP event for demonstrating US reach and boosting American morale. Aircrews, however, express reluctance for leaflet-dropping missions due to a lack of confidence in their effectiveness.

Post-WWII (Cold War Era):

• 1945-1946: Army psychological warfare staffs and units dissipate with general demobilization.
• 1947: The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is created, providing an organizational vehicle for covert psychological operations and political action. The Tactical Information Detachment is formed at Fort Riley, Kansas, as the only operational psychological warfare troop unit in the US Army.
• 1949: The communist takeover of mainland China occurs, despite US efforts and determination, due to strong popular support for the Chiang Kai-shek regime.
• 1950 (June): The Tactical Information Detachment, reorganized as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, is sent to Korea after North Koreans attack South Korea.
• 1950: President Harry S Truman creates the Psychological Strategy Board in the White House to focus on government-wide psychological activities. The International Information Administration is established within the State Department.
• Early 1950s: The Philippine government, with US advisors, successfully campaigns against the Hukbalahap insurgency, integrating military, political, and psychological actions.
• 1952: The US Army establishes the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
• 1953: The US Information Agency (USIA) is established as an autonomous agency reporting to the National Security Council.
• 1956 (Suez Affair): Widespread international condemnation of the Israeli-British-French invasion of Egypt is noted as a consensus of world opinion.
• 1956: The Psychological Warfare Center's title is changed to the Special Warfare Center, and the Army's psychological operations capability erodes by the early 1960s.
• 1957: Russia launches the first two Sputniks, followed by space achievements, leading to a reevaluation of the superpowers' standings and contributing to the idea of a stalemate.
• 1958 (Lebanon): US psychological operations campaigns are reasonably effective.
• After 1960: American efforts concerning Africa grow.
• 1962 (Dominican Republic): US psychological operations campaigns are undertaken.
• 1962 (Cuba): A public opinion study showing Castro's overwhelming popularity is made available to the US government prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion but is not brought to the attention of the new Kennedy administration, leading to a "failure" of the invasion.
• 1963: The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) campaign is adopted in Vietnam, offering communist soldiers forgiveness and exoneration for returning home.

Vietnam War Era (1960s-1970s):

• 1960: Use of all types of media, including Radio Hanoi and Vietcong clandestine transmitters, increases in an accelerated propaganda offensive against the government of Vietnam.
• Mid-1960s: The US government's political warfare capabilities progressively atrophy due to the militarization of the Vietnam War and larger issues of governmental organization and national style.
• 1965 (May): The Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) is established in Saigon to coordinate US psychological operations (PSYOP) policies and personnel from USIA, DOD, and USAID.
• 1965: The 6th Psychological Operations Battalion is activated in Vietnam.
• 1967: Army PSYOP forces in Vietnam expand to the 4th Psychological Operations Group with four battalions. The 7th Psychological Operations Group in Okinawa provides backup support.
• 1967 (December 28): JUSPAO Planning Office establishes PSYOP priorities.
• 1968 (Mid-February): Immediately after the Tet Offensive, a majority of Americans remain hawks, with sentiment for escalation increasing.
• 1968 (June): Half of the US public shifts to the "dove" side, with 7% favoring cutback and 42% wanting withdrawal from Vietnam.
• 1969 (Fall): The Vietnam moratorium occurs.
• 1970 (June): Gallup reports that 56% of Americans believe the US made a mistake sending troops to Vietnam.
• 1970-1971 (Delta, Vietnam): "Operation Roundup" and "Project Falling Leaves" are successful Chieu Hoi operations combining PSYOP and combat pressure.
• 1971 (Spring): JUSPAO has distributed nearly four billion leaflets in the Chieu Hoi campaign.
• 1973: Prisoner of war exchange negotiations take place in Hanoi, where Colonel Harry Summers is told that American army battle prowess is "totally irrelevant" to the communists' political and psychological campaigns.

Post-Vietnam (1970s-1980s):

• Mid-1970s: Only an inadequately staffed and equipped 4th Psychological Operations Group remains in the active component.
• 1979: Stanislav Levchenko, a former major in the KGB and active measures specialist, defects to the United States.
• 1979 (Iranian Embassy Hostage Debacle): US leaders are "duped" into referring to Iranian terrorists and kidnappers as "students," illustrating the sway of terminology on public perceptions.
• 1980 (since): Without US intervention, 10 attempts to remove Muammar Qadhafi by members of his military have occurred.
• Early 1980s: A major effort begins to revitalize US military PSYOP.
• 1981 (Summer): President Ronald Reagan's initial national security strategy emphasizes diplomatic, economic, military, and informational components.
• 1982 (July 13-14): Stanislav Levchenko testifies before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, appraising Soviet active measures as "massive."
• 1983 (January): President Reagan signs National Security Decision Directive 77, "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security," defining public diplomacy and establishing an interagency mechanism.
• 1983 (July): The New Delhi Patriot publishes a forged letter claiming the AIDS virus was developed by the CIA and the Pentagon at Fort Detrick, Maryland.
• 1983 (October): A World Peace Congress is held in Prague, planned and directed by the World Peace Council (WPC).
• 1983 (November 25): A forged document purporting to be a speech by US Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger surfaces in West Germany, aiming to discredit SDI and US intentions.
• 1984: A landmark National Security Defense Directive (NSDD) establishes international communications as a major instrument of national security policy, directing revitalization of armed forces' PSYOP capabilities in a military context.
• 1985 (April): Leaders of 13 Soviet international fronts meet in Helsinki to launch a campaign against the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
• 1985 (Summer): An obscure French-language weekly newspaper in Madagascar, Carrefour, carries a forged letter claiming US and South African scientists are secretly working on psychotropic chemical and "ethnic" weapons.
• 1985 (October): Literaturnaya Gazeta attempts to launch a campaign through the New Delhi Patriot claiming AIDS was a "made-in-the-USA" product.
• 1985 (November): President Reagan meets with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva, discussing disarmament and cultural exchange.
• 1985: Mikhail Gorbachev becomes Soviet leader, initiating domestic political and economic reforms (glasnost). The DOD PSYOP Master Plan is developed to rebuild worldwide military PSYOP capabilities.
• 1986 (May): Litgaz newspaper attempts again to spread the AIDS-made-in-USA story with little success.
• 1986 (August 20): Stanislav Levchenko makes observations about Anatolii Fedorovich Dobrynin's appointment to the International Department at a USIA briefing in Washington.
• 1986 (Harare Nonaligned Summit): A Soviet-directed AIDS disinformation campaign, claiming the US government (CIA) was behind the AIDS virus, is launched with far more success than previous attempts.
• 1986 (April 15): The United States carries out a bombing raid on Libyan targets, viewed as a psychological operation to influence attitudes and behaviors concerning terrorism.
• 1986 (June 23): Time Magazine reports on Qadhafi's exhausted appearance, reinforcing the belief he was recovering from the shock of the April 15 raid.
• 1986 (October): A World Peace Congress is held in Copenhagen, planned and directed by the WPC, but exposed by Denmark's Social Democratic Party (SDP) as a Soviet front operation.
• 1987 (June): USIA Director Charles Wick walks out of a meeting with the director of Novosti after the latter repeats the "ethnic weapon" lie.
• 1987 (October 15): Secretary Weinberger decides to assign Army and Air Force active and reserve component psychological operations and civil affairs units to USSOCOM, sealing the fate of initiatives to separate PSYOP from special operations and create a joint PSYOP center.
• 1988 (July): Polling data show 94% of US voters believe US-USSR relations are stable or improving.
• 1988 (November): Margaret Thatcher concludes the Cold War has ended.
• 1988 (November 18): Congress passes the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, declaring a policy to create a "Drug-Free America by 1995" and defining international drug trafficking as a national security threat.
• 1989 (September): The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) publishes its first "National Drug Control Strategy."
• 1989 (Worldwide Psychological Operations Conference): Lt Gen Michael Carnes suggests changing the name "psychological operations" due to negative connotations.
• 1990 (March): President George H. Bush's National Security Strategy places less explicit emphasis on information.
• 1990 (August): A PSYOP planning group for Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, consisting of military and civilian personnel from CENTCOM, SOCOM, and the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), is formed at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.
• 1990 (August 11): Hours after President George H. Bush's address to Congress, INA (Iraqi News Agency) carries a lengthy rebuttal.
• 1990 (November): The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact occurs.
• 1990 (December 20 - Operation Just Cause): US forces launch operations in Panama. PSYOP are integrated into the planning, with loudspeaker teams accompanying combat units. Guillermo Endara, the new President of Panama, communicates via a PSYOP radio station and offers $150 for turned-in weapons.
• 1991 (January): Coalition tactical leaflet and radio activities begin for Desert Shield/Desert Storm, coinciding with the air campaign.
• 1991 (February): Loudspeaker and Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) actions begin for Desert Shield/Desert Storm with the ground campaign.
• 1991 (May): PSYOP operations in Panama conclude.
• 1991 (August): President George H. Bush's National Security Strategy places less explicit emphasis on information.
• 1992 (May): Overall policy responsibility for PSYOP in OSD is moved to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.
• 1992 (June): Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin signs a strategic arms control agreement with President George Bush.
• 1992 (April): The "Final Report to Congress Conduct of the Persian Gulf War" validates the success of leaflet operations in Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Mid-1990s:

• 1996 (September): "Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies" is published by Air University Press.

Late 1990s (Bosnia, Kosovo):

• 1995 (December): NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) approves themes and objectives for the IFOR (Implementation Force) Information Campaign (IIC) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, primarily as a force protection tool.
• 1999 (June 10): NATO suspends the air campaign in Operation ALLIED FORCE after the full withdrawal of Yugoslavian security forces from Kosovo begins. PSYOP is credited with playing a key role in setting conditions for this victory.
• 1999 (April 1 - June 27): During the 78-day air campaign of Operation ALLIED FORCE, 104.5 million leaflets are dropped throughout Serbia, and daily radio and television programs in Serbian and Albanian are broadcast by EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft.
• 1999 (October 1): The US Information Agency (USIA) merges with the Department of State, forming the Office of International Information Programs (IIP).

Early 2000s (Afghanistan, Counterterrorism):

• 2001 (October 14-21): B-52s drop over 10 million leaflets across Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. MC-130s also drop leaflets.
• 2001 (October 15): Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announces that US planes are dropping leaflets and broadcasting messages in Afghanistan to win support for the anti-terrorist campaign.
• 2001 (October 19): Four PSYOP specialists parachute in with Army Rangers who raid a Taliban compound and air base, spreading leaflets with the picture of a New York firefighter raising an American flag.
• 2001 (December 12): Robert Andrews, Principal Duty Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict), discusses the use of EC-130 aircraft ("COMMANDO SOLO") for broadcasting five-hour radio programs in Afghanistan.
• 2003 (September 5): Joint Publication 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations," is published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This publication revises PSYOP categories, discusses missions, measures of effectiveness, integration with information operations, and updates organizational responsibilities and command relationships.

Mid-2000s (Somalia, Metadata Collection):

• 2004: The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for Somalia is established in Kenya.
• 2006: Ethiopian military forces begin occupying Somalia to protect the TFG. Al-Shabaab, meaning "the youth," emerges as a violent insurgency group.
• 2006 (May 23): The government files its initial application to the FISA Court to authorize the bulk metadata collection program.
• 2007 (December 21 - 2008 August): Moalin and his codefendants are involved in a series of recorded calls and money transfers from San Diego to Somalia, supporting "Shikhalow" (alleged to be Aden Hashi Ayrow) and his organization.
• 2008 (March): The United States designates al-Shabaab a foreign terrorist organization.
• 2008 (May 1): Aden Hashi Ayrow, a key figure in al-Shabaab, is killed in a US missile strike.

2010s:

• 2013 (April 25): The FISA Court issues an order (BR 13-80) authorizing the metadata collection program under FISA Subchapter IV, requiring telecommunications providers to turn over "all call detail records or 'telephony metadata'" on an "ongoing daily" basis.
• 2013 (August 29): The FISA Court issues another order (BR 13-109) detailing the scope of metadata collection, including communications between the US and abroad, and wholly within the US.
• 2014 (June 19): The FISA Court issues an order (BR 14-96) regarding the NSA's querying of the metadata database, allowing searches within three "hops" of a specific selection term.
• 2016 (November 10): Oral arguments are heard in the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for United States v. Moalin, et al., regarding convictions for providing material support to terrorists and a foreign terrorist organization, and challenges to the metadata collection program.
• 2020 (September 2): The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit files its opinion in United States v. Moalin, et al., affirming convictions but holding that the metadata collection exceeded Congress's authorization under FISA.

Cast of Characters

Military Leaders & Officials:

• General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower: Commander of Allied Forces Headquarters in North Africa (1942) and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (1944). He believed psychological warfare was a specific and effective weapon in "total war" and considered war correspondents "quasi-staff officers."
• General George S. Patton, US Army: Believed in making the mind control the body in battle, emphasizing psychological resolve.
• General Tao Hanzhang: Chinese military theorist who, in his interpretation of Sun Tzu, advised irritating choleric opponents and sowing dissension among united enemies.
• Admiral J.O. Ellis, United States Navy: Commander, Joint Task Force NOBLE ANVIL, who lauded the significant impact of PSYOP efforts on the success of Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo.
• COL James Treadwell: Commander of the 4th Psychological Operations Group, who stated that "the truth is the best propaganda" to maintain credibility with the audience.
• General Carl Stiner, US Army: Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command (1990-1993), who called PSYOP "the most powerful weapon in the SOF inventory."
• Lt Gen Samuel V. Wilson, USA, Retired: President of Blackburn College; served in various key military and civilian roles, including with the Office of Strategic Services, Merrill's Marauders, and as Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. Advocate for the psychological dimension of warfare.
• Col Robert M. Schoenhaus: Commander of the 7th Psychological Operations Group in June 1999, mentioned in relation to Army PSYOP capabilities.
• Gen Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Retired: Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Chairman of the DOD Security Review Commission; spearheaded the 1985 DOD PSYOP Master Plan; believed in the crucial role of the psychological weapon in counterinsurgency.
• Col Fred W. Walker, USAF, Retired: First Chief of the Psychological Operations Directorate, J-9, US Special Operations Command; advocated for clear and understandable persuasive communications in peacetime and countering disinformation.
• Col Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., USA, Retired: Served multiple combat tours with Special Forces; commanded the 6th and 4th Psychological Operations Battalions; was Director for Psychological Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Authored "U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins" and wrote on the evolution and revitalization of US military PSYOP.
• Col Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., USAFR: Politico-military affairs officer with the Directorate of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, J-9, Headquarters US Special Operations Command; compared military PSYOP with civilian business marketing.
• Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF: Dean, Education and Research, Air Command and Staff College, Air University; co-editor of "Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies"; advocated for increased US sensitivity to the psychological dimension of warfare and the value of overt PSYOP.
• Col Daniel W. Jacobowitz, USAF, Retired: Assigned to strategic missile operations and political-military field at Air University; co-editor of "Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies"; wrote on PSYOP in Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Operation ALLIED FORCE.
• Lt Col Philip P. Katz, USA, Retired: Emphasized that the critical variable in military PSYOP is influencing foreign populations' perceptions and will; wrote on US PSYOP in Vietnam.
• Maj James V. Keifer, USAF, Retired: Psychological operations staff officer in the Directorate of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, J-9, Headquarters US Special Operations Command; wrote on the role of military PSYOP in supporting national antidrug policy and the psychological dimension of the Persian Gulf War.
• Lt Col John Ozaki, USA: Career military officer; wrote on the necessity of carefully planned and coordinated defector operations in counterinsurgency.
• General Marc A. Cisneros: Commanding General, US Army South (USARSO), who signed safe conduct passes during Operation Just Cause in Panama, leveraging his good reputation for credibility among the Panamanian population.
• Lieutenant General Stiner: Commander of Joint Task Force-South (CJTF-South) during the planning for Operation Just Cause in Panama; directed increased emphasis on loudspeaker teams.
• General Thurman: Commander of CINCSOUTH during Operation Just Cause; later received PSYOP advice and expedition from the 4th PSYOP Group commander.
• Lt Gen Michael Carnes: Director of the Joint Staff in 1989; suggested changing the name "psychological operations" due to negative connotations.
• MSgt Richard A. Blair, USAFR: Military intelligence analyst; staff assistant to the senior military liaison and defense advisor, US Information Agency; provided analysis of Iraqi psychological operations during the Persian Gulf War.
• General William C. Westmoreland: US military commander in Vietnam; later had a notable exchange with a North Vietnamese officer in Hanoi about the irrelevance of military victories without political and psychological success.
• Lt Jeffrey Zaun: A captured Coalition pilot during the Gulf War who, through adapted methods, exaggerated his maltreatment to inform the world the Iraqis were violating the Geneva convention, contributing to a backlash against Saddam.

Civilian Government Officials & Experts:

• Robert Andrews: Principal Duty Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict) in 2001; discussed COMMANDO SOLO operations in Afghanistan.
• Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger: Secretary of Defense under President Reagan; ordered the revitalization of psychological operations capabilities and the development of the 1985 DOD PSYOP Master Plan. Made a key decision to assign PSYOP units to USSOCOM.
• President Ronald Reagan: US President; strongly anti-communist; directed revitalization of PSYOP capabilities and outlined national security strategies emphasizing the psychological component.
• President Harry S Truman: US President; created the Psychological Strategy Board in 1950.
• President Dwight D. ("Ike") Eisenhower: US President; created the US Information Agency (USIA) as an autonomous agency.
• President John Fitzgerald Kennedy: US President; a fervent believer in polling, relying on surveys for domestic and international issues.
• President Lyndon Baines Johnson: US President; used polls regularly; established JUSPAO in Vietnam.
• President Richard Milhous Nixon: US President; asserted a distinction between public opinion and public demonstrations, arguing against policy being made "in the streets."
• President George H. Bush: US President; his national security strategies placed less explicit emphasis on information than Reagan's.
• President George Bush: US President; signed a strategic arms control agreement with Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin in 1992.
• President Guillermo Endara: New President of Panama after Operation Just Cause; communicated with Panamanians via a PSYOP radio station and offered rewards for turned-in weapons.
• Dr Carnes Lord: Distinguished fellow at the National Defense University; former Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs; explored historical influences on US strategy for psychological and political warfare; criticized American cultural inhibitions and bureaucratic weaknesses regarding PSYOP.
• George V. Allen: Former director of the US Information Agency (USIA); argued against the fallacy that explaining US policies alone would make foreign peoples "love us," emphasizing the need for realistic approaches and a combination of efforts.
• Lloyd A. Free: President, Institute for International Social Research; editor, Public Opinion Quarterly; advisor to Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson; wrote on the role of public opinion in international security affairs.
• Ronald D. McLaurin: Expert cited in the context of US PSYOP in Vietnam; researcher at the American Institute for Research; wrote on the importance of credibility and systematic planning in PSYOP.
• Michael A. Morris: Fellow at the Canadian Institute of International Affairs; wrote on the necessity of clearly defined national policy objectives.
• Laurence J. Orzell: European branch chief, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion; wrote on Poland's underground media as a successful example of non-governmental PSYOP.
• Dr Fred Ikle: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; sent letters in 1986 and 1987 emphasizing the Secretary of Defense's intention to revitalize military PSYOP capabilities.
• William H. Jackson: Headed the president's Committee on International Information Activities (1952-1954), which criticized the lack of effective central direction in the national information program.
• John Foster Dulles: US Secretary of State under President Eisenhower; believed that taking into account foreign public opinion would be derelict in his duty.
• Dean Acheson: US Secretary of State; claimed Americans suffer from a "Narcissus psychosis" regarding world opinion and that "world opinion simply does not exist on matters that concern us."
• William J. Bennett: Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in the late 1980s/early 1990s; advocated a "stubborn determination" to reduce drug use and opposed drug legalization.
• Tommy Corcoran: Credited Franklin D. Roosevelt with understanding that public opinion limited and provided instrumentalities for exerting presidential power.
• Hadley Cantril: Late associate of Lloyd A. Free; conducted surveys of American public opinion for President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
• Nelson Rockefeller: Consultant to President Eisenhower in 1955; worked with Lloyd A. Free on reports about the psychological situation abroad.
• Jerome Wisener: Stated that John Fitzgerald Kennedy understood he could exercise power only with the consensus of the people and Congress, leading Kennedy to be a fervent believer in polling.
• Lou Harris: Conducted special surveys on domestic opinion for President John Fitzgerald Kennedy.
• Oliver Quayle: Conducted polls for President Lyndon Baines Johnson, including on international issues.
• Paul Lazarsfeld, Carl Hovland, Kurt Lewin, Harold Lasswell: Psychologists, sociologist, and political scientist, respectively, credited as founders of communications research, the fundamental root of PSYOP.
• Robert Holt and Robert Van de Velde: Authors of "Strategic Psychological Operations," who stated the US has never fully understood the nature of the psychological instrument.
• Stefan Possony: Expert who analyzed Vietcong propaganda, concluding the US was the target of a skillful offensive.
• Douglas Pike: Noted expert on the Viet Cong; claimed the various social groups they mobilized served as their "mass organizations."
• Saddam Hussein: Iraqi dictator; his government mounted a psychological warfare campaign during the Persian Gulf War, using religious words, Arab nationalism, and self-praise. His propaganda model was closely based on the Soviet system.
• Tariq Aziz: Iraqi Foreign Minister during the Persian Gulf War; composed a lengthy rejoinder to President George H. Bush's address.

Foreign Actors & Entities:

• Siad Barre: Military dictator of Somalia, ousted in 1991, leading to civil war.
• Aden Hashi Ayrow (AKA Shikhalow / Majadhub): Key figure in al-Shabaab; killed in a US missile strike on May 1, 2008; alleged recipient of funds from Moalin and his codefendants.
• Basaaly Saeed Moalin (AKA Basal, AKA Muse Shekhnor Roble): Defendant-Appellant in United States v. Moalin, et al., convicted of providing material support to terrorists and a foreign terrorist organization.
• Mohamed Mohamed Mohamud (AKA Mohamed Khadar, AKA Sheikh Mohamed): Defendant-Appellant in United States v. Moalin, et al., involved in financial transfers to Somalia.
• Issa Doreh (AKA Sheikh Issa): Defendant-Appellant in United States v. Moalin, et al., convicted of providing material support to terrorists and a foreign terrorist organization; worked at Shidaal Express, a hawala used for money transfers to Somalia.
• Ahmed Nasir Taalil Mohamud: Defendant-Appellant in United States v. Moalin, et al.
• Farah Shidane (AKA Farah Yare): Proposed defense witness in United States v. Moalin, et al., identified as part of local administration in Somalia fighting al-Shabaab; alleged recipient of funds for humanitarian purposes.
• Shikhalow / Majadhub: Code names used in intercepted calls, identified by the prosecution as Aden Hashi Ayrow.
• Yusuf Mohamed Ali: Name used as the recipient for money transfers in Somalia by Shidaal Express.
• Dhunkaal Warfaa, Dhunkaal Mohamed Yusuf, Mohamed Yusuf Dhunkaal: Names associated with money transfers in Somalia.
• Abdiwali Ahmed, Sahra Warsame, Zahra Warsame: Senders of money transfers to Somalia.
• Anatolii F. Dobrynin: Former Soviet Ambassador to the US; appointed secretary of the International Department by Mikhail S. Gorbachev in 1986; believed by Stanislav Levchenko to reinvigorate Soviet active measures.
• Stanislav Levchenko: Former KGB major and active measures specialist; defected to the US in 1979; testified about the massive scale of Soviet active measures and expressed concern over Dobrynin's appointment.
• Mikhail S. Gorbachev: Soviet General Secretary (1985 onwards); initiated glasnost (openness) and sought to reduce international tensions.
• Romesh Chandra: President of the World Peace Council (WPC) and member of the Politburo of the Indian Communist Party; hosted the Helsinki meeting of Soviet fronts in 1985.
• General Nino Pasti: Italian General, former NATO deputy commander; a member of Generals for Peace and Disarmament, a Soviet front.
• Brigadier Michael Harbottle OBE: Chaired Generals for Peace and Disarmament; his group's views were contrary to the British government and its allies.
• Professor Jgcob Segal and Lilli Segal: Principal authors of the Harare Summit AIDS document; claimed the AIDS virus was artificially created by American scientists, a claim that was widely debunked but propagated by Soviet disinformation.
• Dr John Seale (London venereologist) and Dr Robert Strecker (California gastroenterologist): Quoted in the London Sunday Express in connection with Segal's claims about the man-made AIDS virus, though they did not subscribe to the specific Fort Detrick disinformation.
• Muammar Qadhafi: Leader of Libya; targeted by a US air raid in 1986 as a psychological operation. His popularity declined, and his wisdom was questioned by the Soviets after the raid.
• Norbert Schultze: Composer of "Lili Marlene," a song used by both sides for PSYOP effect in World War II.
• General Tao Hanzhang: Chinese military strategist; his interpretation of Sun Tzu's "Art of War" is referenced.
• Vo Nguyen Giap: Vietnamese general; quoted Ho Chi Minh's principle of political warfare: "Do not attempt to overthrow the enemy but try to win over and make use of him."
• Ho Chi Minh: Vietnamese revolutionary leader; his cardinal principle of political warfare focused on winning over and utilizing the enemy rather than overthrowing them.
• Ramon Magsaysay: Secretary of National Defense (later President) of the Philippines; led a successful counterinsurgency campaign against the Huks, emphasizing reindoctrination of the army and direct interaction with the populace.
• Col Harry Summers: US Army officer; had a famous exchange with a North Vietnamese officer in Hanoi about the irrelevance of US military victories in Vietnam.
• Georgii Arbatov: Soviet propagandist from the Institute of the USA and Canada.
• Aleksandr Yakovlev: Politburo member and Soviet propagandist.
• Vladimir Posner: Soviet propagandist from Radio Moscow.
• F.O. Mikchei: Summarized Soviet military evaluations of American soldiers in the 1950s.
• Chien Hoi (Hoi Chanh): "Open Arms" program and the term for former Viet Cong who defected, utilized in US PSYOP during the Vietnam War.
• Vietcong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA): Opposing forces in the Vietnam War, targeted by US PSYOP.
• Hukbalahap (Huks): Insurgent group in the Philippine Islands against whom the Philippine government conducted a successful counterinsurgency campaign.
• Cheka: Earliest forerunner of the KGB, known for torture methods later mirrored in Soviet disinformation.
• Tass: Soviet official news agency, involved in disseminating disinformation.
• Novosti: Supposedly independent Soviet news agency, heavily staffed by the KGB.
• Radio Halgan: Radio station operated by a communist-front group of Somali dissidents in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, used for KGB disinformation.
• Iraqi News Agency (INA): Iraqi state news agency, used for rapid rebuttals and propaganda during the Persian Gulf War.
• Al-Thawrah: Largest daily newspaper in Iraq, published by the Baath Party.
• Al-Jumhuriyah and Baghdad Observer: Widely read daily newspapers in Iraq, managed by the MCI.
• Al-Qadisiyah: Arabic daily newspaper published by the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.
• Palestinian elements in Baghdad: Produced "Voice of the Palestine Liberation Organization" radio program broadcast over the Iraqi shortwave network.
• Panama Defense Forces (PDF) and DIGBAT goon squads: Targeted by US PSYOP during Operation Just Cause in Panama.
• Solidarity: Polish trade union movement; its activists established an underground press during martial law.
• Workers' Defense Committee (later Social Self-defense Committee): Polish dissident group that established illegal publishing ventures.
• Independent Publishing House (NOWA): Polish illegal publishing enterprise.
• Committees for Social Defense (KOS): Polish underground group publishing a journal primarily for an intellectual audience.
• Fighting Solidarity (Solidarnosc Walczaca): Polish underground group advocating a more confrontational stance.
• Confederation for an Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej): Right-of-center Polish group predating Solidarity, disseminating critiques of the regime.
• Chandra, Romesh: President of the World Peace Council and Politburo member of the Indian Communist Party.
• Giap, Vo Nguyen: North Vietnamese general, quoted Ho Chi Minh on political warfare.
• Hussein, Saddam: Leader of Iraq during the Persian Gulf War, orchestrated propaganda campaigns.
• Khan, Genghis: Mongolian leader, cited for his successful exploits in ancient psychological operations.
• Lenin: Referred to "fronts" as "transmission belts" for Soviet policy.
• Qadhafi, Muammar: Libyan leader, subject of a US psychological operation air raid.
• Stilwell, Gen Richard G.: Late US Army General, emphasized political-psychological dimensions of counterinsurgency.
• Sun Tzu: Ancient Chinese strategist, advocated subduing the enemy without fighting, "the supreme excellence."
• Yudovich, Lev: Born and educated in the USSR, former Red Army platoon/company commander, later a professor of military and political science and writer for "Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe"; wrote on Soviet indoctrination of hate.